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This article addresses the international political theory of German radical conservatism in its 
transformations from Weimar nationalism to post-WW2 adoption of a global perspective. 
Analyzing the work of Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, and Hans Freyer – three prominent figures 
of the scene – I identify a paradox in their attempt to expand the nationalistic-particularistic 
‘political’ to the global level. I focus on several shared themes that reflected and co-
constituted the problem: the plurality of the political world, a ‘planetary’ perspective, the 
universalizing effects of technology and (civil) war, the philosophy of history, and the world-
state. While the parallels between the three theorists are substantial, each reacted dissimilarly 
to the rupture of 1945. Schmitt historicized his theory of multipolarity and provided quasi-
theological groundings for political particularity. In a parallel fashion, Freyer cast world 
history as an empirical sum of states’ political actions, causing cultural universality, yet 
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denied the political unity of the world. Jünger, by contrast, advocated a post- historical and 
post-political world-state to solve global problems. The solutions testify to the impossibility 
of truly globalizing the ‘political’ conceived nationalistically – a dilemma arguably still 
plaguing contemporary discussions on globalization, multipolarity, and universalism which 




Real-world developments often push concepts to their limits and casts doubt on their 
applicability and consistency. The indisputable trend of globalization, for instance, has had 
profound effects on how we understand politics and ‘the political,’ and it arguably challenges 
these very categories. With the other central political notions, such as ‘citizenship,’ ‘rights,’ 
or ‘legitimacy,’ assuming global dimensions, can we still afford interpreting ‘the political’ in 
primarily national terms? 
 
Rather than tackling the multi-faceted phenomenon of globalization in its entirety, I here 
focus on the particular issue of what happens to ‘the political’ in the transition to the global 
scale. The dilemma has been acknowledged for some time, although it is rarely addressed 
directly. Further, the debate on the political has been divided into sequences marked off by 
concrete political developments. Not long ago, in the atmosphere of relief after the Cold War, 
globalization was expected to bring about a condition of post-national universalism and 
worldwide democracy – if not the world-state, the disappearance of conflicts, and the end of 
history.1 This raised the question of whether global uniformity would imply the withdrawal of 
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the political from the world in favor of the non-political drives of the market, underpinned by 
the universalizing effects of technology. 
 
Recently, unipolarity and nascent globalism have, however, made way for neonationalism and 
multipolarity – with or without imperialist ramifications and the concomitant idea of spheres 
of influence. Questions regarding world unity and the fate of the political are now posed in a 
rather different key. The decisive question is now rather whether the ‘escape of the political 
from the categorical framework of the nation-state’2, as observed in the era of post-bipolar 
optimism, actually meant the emergence of more varied, and consequently less controllable, 
forms of the political in economic, military, or cultural forms – that is, whether the liberation 
of the political from national bounds actually turned into a mere unleashing of powers that are 
of national/nationalistic origins, yet of global scale (e.g. hybrid wars, cyber attacks, or the 
world-wide contagion of populist neonationalism). With the ‘return of the political,’ the 
diagnosis of postpolitics and posthistoire proved to be premature; yet what keeps history 
running, for the theorists of this return, is precisely political differences and conflicts3, and the 
globalization of the political, for them, seems to lead not to ‘world domestic policy’4 but to 
the perpetuation of ideological conflicts on the global level. 
 
However, an element of benign universalism, necessitated by the truly planetary nature of our 
environmental and economic challenges, also remains. The present confusion regarding the 
political can arguably be traced to the peculiar combination of the globality of the problems 
and the remnants of nationalistic particularity in the framework in which they are addressed. 
The concept of ‘the political’ still interpreted in nationalistic terms is an essential part of the 
problem: no truly global concept of the political has emerged to correspond to the globality of 
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the challenges, and the conclusions therefore barrenly oscillate between the equally 
undesirable alternatives of naïve non-political universalism and a truly politicized globe at the 
mercy of global civil war. 
 
It is the task of political theorists to sketch ways out of this conundrum. Here I only venture to 
reformulate the problem in terms of intellectual history. I trace the key questions of the 
universalist/non-political and multipolar/political sequences of the debate to their mid-20th-
century German precedents and suggest uncanny parallels between how they were and are 
answered. The essay revisits the international and global political thought of three German 
intellectuals who started as radical conservatives in the interbellum era and readjusted their 
perspectives after 1945: the legal scholar Carl Schmitt, the sociologist and philosopher Hans 
Freyer, and the author and political theorist Ernst Jünger.5 
 
I focus on Schmitt, Freyer, and Jünger, first, because they were the most prominent theorists 
of not only politics but also ‘the political’ amongst the German Right, and therefore 
particularly vulnerable to the problems in the attempt to scale up the political. Second, they 
directly tackled the larger phenomenon what we would nowadays call ‘globalization’ and its 
effects on the political form of the state – reflecting on the technologization of war, the total 
mobilization of resources, central planning and the totalization of states, and the consequent 
increasing of the spatial areas for which industrial-military plans were made. Their work 
paradigmatically exemplifies the conceptual problem brought about by real-world scaling-up. 
Third, while most Weimar radical conservatives died earlier, Schmitt, Freyer, and Jünger 
were active after 1945, thus having to reconsider their radically nationalistic categories, and in 
line with differences in their earlier thought, they reacted dissimilarly. Fourth, the three 
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thinkers also interacted, adopted each other’s ideas and shared a theoretical language – a 
cumulative discourse the main elements of which I analyze.6 Crucially, language often 
persists longer than the challenges that provoked it; in fact, the language of radical-
conservative globalization theory still affects the way current thinkers conceptualize global 
issues – and arguably upholds the aforementioned dilemmas. In excessively building upon 
what remains of the radical conservative notion of the political, present-day analysts risk 
making unnecessary theoretical commitments which may hinder the development of new 
notions of the global political. 
 
Scholars have recently discussed Schmitt’s contributions to international relations and 
geopolitics7, his ideas of world unity and unipolarity, and his theologically oriented 
philosophy of history together with its imperial underpinnings.8 Freyer and Jünger, by 
contrast, are not usually read as theorists of the global system, yet the comparison relativizes 
the role of a singular adversary of universalism often attributed to Schmitt. The relationship 
between Jünger’s and Schmitt’s post-WW2 theories of war has been noted9, and certain of my 
interpretative categories also utilized by others10, but no systematic comparisons of Schmitt’s, 
Freyer’s, and Jünger’s global thought are available. Jünger’s changing positions with regard 
to the political have been noted11, yet particularly my interpretative prism – the paradox of 
globalizing the political – has escaped the attention of previous scholars, although, I claim, 
this problem stands at the core of their aspirations and failures alike. 
 
Although starting with premises reminiscent of classical IR realism, Freyer, Jünger and 
Schmitt analyzed global issues non-dogmatically and were attuned to the ongoing cataclysm 
of the nation-state and its military circumstances. The internal development of the global 
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political order pointed toward a rejection of their initial nationalistic premises, yet the 
political seemed to simultaneously erode. Their dilemma was that of mapping the universalist 
dimensions of a global political community by starting with inherently particularistic 
premises leaning on the excluded other – a framework which had itself emerged as a result of 
the all-too-successful 19th-century nationalization of earlier universalistic views of global 
community.12 The resulting paradox took many forms. First, the military economies of scale 
favored larger enterprises, pushing states towards empires and leagues with spatial 
groundings; however, an excessively successful world empire would become non-political, as 
there would be no one to exclude in a globalized world. Second, the logic of material warfare 
necessitated the universal adoption of shared technologies and the concomitant rationalities, 
and war – once the paradigmatic expression of political particularity – now seemed to 
promote technological universalism and the dissolving of differences. Third, this conundrum 
was further radicalized by the WW2 experience and the nuclear threat, which compelled 
existential-ethical reflections with eschatological overtones: survival seemed to necessitate 
planetary approches, but already the universality of the problem suggested a common fate for 
all humanity, even though the triggering impulses were particularistic and political. Through 
several mechanisms, the political thus appeared to produce its own eclipse. 
 
This pushed the radical conservatives to the largely paradoxical attempt to correspondingly 
‘globalize’ their perspective, which was reflected in their key notions – or, rather, the paradox 
arose out of the interrelations of their idiosyncratic categories. I will particularly use the 
following intertwined elements as inlets into their global thought and its paradoxes: 1) the 
plurality of the political world, 2) the planetary perspective, 3) the problem of technology, 4) 
the question of war and civil war, 5) the aspect of the philosophy of history, and, finally, 6) 
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the question of the world state. While their argumentation was remarkably similar in the first 
five points, with regard to the world-state they, however, differed with Schmitt and Freyer 
resisting and Jünger supporting it. I first engage with the radical conservatives’ starting points 
in the Weimar Republic. The following three sections address the changes in each thinker, 
respectively, around the Second World War. The concluding section reassesses each of the six 
categories and suggests the contemporary relevance of the radical-conservative globalization 
discourse.  
 
2. Political statehood and planetary tendencies during the Weimar Republic 
 
Schmitt’s theory of the distinction between friend and enemy as the criterion of the political 
has become common knowledge, and I will address it only insofar as the state, warfare, and 
the global order are concerned. With his notion of ‘the political,’ Schmitt sought to explain 
the intensified wars and totalized states better than the traditional vocabulary, which identified 
the political with the state. Although Schmitt stressed the independence of the political and 
anticipated the end of statehood, his normative starting point was still the classic post-
Westphalian nation-state: he defended its sovereignty and unlimited ius belli and resisted 
revolutionary politics and wars waged as ideological crusades – a tendency he attributed to 
the Western powers’ incrimination of Germany after WWI. Already here Schmitt 
paradigmatically formulated the first of my analytical categories, that of plurality, postulating 
conceptually the existence of several states and unequivocally rejecting the world-state. ‘The 
political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.’13 The reasoning was as follows: the eventuality 
of wars is the criterion of the political; the humanity as a whole cannot wage wars, for it has 
no enemies – ‘at least not on this planet,’ Schmitt curiously added; therefore, a ‘world “state”’ 
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that encompassed whole humanity but were still properly political was a contradiction in 
terms.14 Wars were still, obviously, waged in the name of humanity, but this for Schmitt was 
merely a propagandistic cover for political interests. Particularly the League of Nations was 
the Western powers’ instrument to judicially legitimize their military victory and to 
discriminate the Germans – a universalist project, but only in the weak territorial sense of 
operating throughout the world, not politically.15 Despite the ‘illusory fiction of world unity,’ 
the world was still characterized by ‘the pluralism of concretely existing states.’16 In 
disclosing the ideological nature of Western universalism, these arguments were equally 
partisan and underpinned the German political cause. At this point, however, Schmitt 
theorized political structures beyond the nation-state only negatively, unveiling their false 
universalism. 
 
Also Freyer theorized the plurality of states and linked the state intimately with war. Building 
on Hegelian philosophy, Freyer saw the state as molding the plural cultural heritage into the 
unity of a people and an empire (Reich).17 The state was a singular unity with a particular 
‘space of destiny.’18 Both in terms of genesis and essence, war was the core of political life, 
because political existence required space that could only be ‘conquered, consolidated and 
preserved’ in war.19 Statehood thus implied certain ‘imperialism’: ‘In order to exist,’ the state 
had to conquer ‘spheres of interest, areas of influence, suzerainties, vassal states and 
colonies,’ albeit only as much as needed, and by peaceful means whenever possible.20 While 
in his Weimar work Schmitt mostly criticized the imperialism of others, masked as 
universalism, Freyer directly justified that of the Germans, turning abstract cultural-
philosophical categories into political concepts that would soon eerily resonate with concrete 
ideological projects. 
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Freyer’s Hegelian cultural philosophy also implied plurality: ‘Wherever meaning appears, it 
appears in a plurality of forms,’ and a ‘multitude’ is never ‘prestabilised into simple 
harmony.’21 Consequently, also the political world always comprised several states. Only 
where political will organized peoples did states in the strong sense exist; and history was 
only effective in the ‘concrete bodies of historical empires’ that arose and sunk.22 History was 
in fact divided into a ‘plurality’ of individual states and into the ‘togetherness, parallelism and 
polarity of political wills that responsibly advocated their respective meaningful contents in 
space and time’ and divided the intermediary areas as their ‘provinces.’23 Such plurality had 
crucial consequences for Freyer’s international thought. First, the plurality of forms precluded 
European unification. Rather than ‘a political unity,’ the ‘form of the political existence’ of 
the West was ‘plurality’ scattered into various national cultures.24 Second, the plurality of 
world history also led Freyer to explicitly reject the world-state as equally utopian as a single 
European Reich.25 Only alliances, rather than unions, were possible between states, and the 
only synthesis above them was ‘the turbulent world history itself,’ not any ‘supra-state.’26 
This was a patently Hegelian argument. Despite theorizing the transition from invididual wills 
to nation-states, on the one hand, and seeing nation-states as sort of individual wills, on the 
other, Hegel did not propose a transition to a supranational institution, but rather confined to 
‘suprapolitical’ world history.27 Freyer’s rejection of the world-state replicated the contingent 
limitations of Hegel’s categories, yet Freyer’s argument was more consistent: he elevated 
history into a world tribunal without any longer assuming the rational unity of history, and 
rather sought to maintain history’s genuinely political nature. War was still the primary 
motor. Yet rather than the advance of the Spirit’s self-consciousness, world history was a 
permanent struggle without an overarching principle or singular direction. The world-state 
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thus appeared as hopelessly utopian and categorically precluded by the pluralism of world 
history and by Freyer’s rejection of the remnants of Enlightenment historiography. 
 
On this basis, we can perhaps comprehend what first appears to be a peculiar side step in 
Freyer’s political theory. In 1930, Freyer reinterpreted Schmitt’s notion of the political from 
the perspective of idealism, defining politics as ‘the historical realization of a cultural content’ 
or the Geist of a people. With this definition, Freyer explicitly noted, the list of the potential 
subjects of the political could be widened: also ‘supra-state powers’ like Europe, Christianity, 
the League of Nations, or even ‘Humanity’ could be carriers of the cultural idea, and in such 
cases individual nations should align with the larger historical force.28 To make the whole 
humanity a potential political subject appears to flagrantly contradict both Freyer’s postulate 
of plurality, excluding the world state, and Schmitt’s point that the humankind can never be a 
political subject because there would be nobody to exclude. The first contradiction, however, 
is only apparent: by speaking conditionally, Freyer clearly implied that none of the proposed 
larger political subjects currently empirically qualified as subjects in the strong sense, and, 
further, only contingently and temporarily could ever do so in tumultuous world history – 
never as a permanent and final condition. However, were states led by a universal league or 
humanity, the situation would not be automatically non-political. The breakaway from 
Schmitt’s conceptual rigidity seems genuine, and precisely herein appears a transient 
opportunity to escape the paradox of the globalized political. As will become evident, Freyer 
later redescribed the political again in energetic, bellicose, and particularistic terms 
reminiscent of Schmitt, scarcely suggesting the idea of a political humanity. However, the 
advantage in Freyer’s conceptualization was that his permanent emphasis on empirical world 
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history allowed for perceiving actual universalizing tendencies without having to postulate 
global political unity. 
 
Already in the Weimar period, the most prominent unifying principle was the ethos of 
technology and economy, indeed ‘a secular and planetary process that turns the humankind 
into a unified race.’29 The second and third analytical categories of planetarity and technology 
intertwined completely. Technology was a self-contained system ‘of planetary proportions’ 
that threatened to create ‘a unified world.’30 Therefore, the political task was to divide this 
unity into several ‘force fields’ of the nation-states and turn technology into ‘a political 
instrument of power.’31 Technological progress on the planetary scale and its unifying effects 
had to be resisted by employing technology to national and conservative ends – a figure of 
thought known as ‘reactionary modernism.’32 In its linkage with nation-states, technology too 
became a tool of power aspirations and imperialism, and its function was to intensify the 
struggle over world domination rather than moderate it with unifying tendencies. While 
Schmitt had criticized others’ particularism masked as universalism and criticized the 
‘satanic’ nature of technology and its false universalism, Freyer argued more directly for the 
particularistic uses of the essentially universalistic technology. Yet the primary manifestation 
thereof was war – an inherently political phenomenon that paradoxically also promoted 
technological universality. 
 
Also Jünger linked politics intimately with war. In his Weimar writings, Jünger sought to 
transpose the war experience into lessons for peacetime politics. While Freyer anticipated a 
‘revolution from the right’ to utilize the leftist revolutionary energies and overcome feeble 
parliamentarianism33, Jünger equally mobilized the energies of war and revolution in favor of 
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a new totalitarian order, both domestically and internationally. The manly communities of the 
trenches were the key remedy against democracy and internationalism, which had no ‘firm 
grounds,’ stood ‘between nations’ and sought to erect ‘a mixture of Esperanto nations’ on the 
basis of ‘expediency’ rather than ‘organic ties.’34 Despite its roots in nationalistic sentiments, 
Jünger’s solution to the problems of political modernity, however, had unmistakable global 
characteristics that matched the global nature of the problem. The modern world was unified 
under the banner of progress, and ‘the great principles of reason,’ Jünger sarcastically noted, 
had gained ‘planetary dominion’ at the cost of ideological wars and civil wars.35 With the 
diffusion of European values, ‘the surface of Europe’ had gone through ‘a planetary 
expansion,’ yet the powerless continent itself had become a mere ‘veneer.’36 This weak liberal 
globality was to be replaced by a global constellation of nationalistic powers – another 
manifestation of the particularism/universalism paradox, which becomes comprehensible in 
the light of Jünger’s idiosyncratic understanding of nationalism. Nations were constantly 
threatened from without by other armed nations, yet Jünger’s nationalism allowed for chivalry 
respect for the enemy and rival cultures, by no means representing their extermination as 
desirable or feasible. Rather the humankind would be best served if each nation brought its 
best impulses into global competition instead of turning everything into a single ‘hopeless 
mush.’37 To draw distinctions and respect national boundaries was the key, not to negate other 
political entities. Jünger’s nationalism thus pertained to the citizens’ existential political 
commitment to the state’s cause, and other such communities of fate also existed per 
definitionem. The plurality of the political world was, again, implied. 
 
Further, the political impetus of the war experience to nation-building was equally available 
to all countries, and Jünger’s nationalism was thus ‘energetic’ rather than ‘substantial.’ 
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Therefore Jünger could build global dimensions into his authoritarianism without 
contradicting his nationalism. In 1932, Jünger argued that bourgeois societies would be 
overcome by a novel political order organized around the mythical figure of the worker, 
emerging from the trenches.38 Carrying both military and proletarian traits, the new order 
would implement military obedience and comprehensive socialist planning. While in his 
political essays Jünger theorized the new type of human being emerging from the trenches, he 
now anticipated the world to be reinterpreted in terms of work and a whole new ‘order of the 
world’ to emerge through ‘wars and civil wars.’39 This, Jünger reasoned, not only enabled but 
also required ‘global dominance’: The worker’s sphere of operations was indeed the ‘globe’ 
comprehended as a ‘unity,’ and the worker thus had a ‘planetary function.’40 
 
Anticipating an ‘imperial turn’ around the globe and the rise of the worker to meet its ‘claim 
for planetary validity,’41 Jünger, however, said little unequivocal about how the novel order 
would emerge. Alongside war and global revolutionary action, the key vehicle for workers’ 
global influence was, again, technology, which imposed its language on every domain and 
thereby weakened the traditional bastions of bourgeois power, such as Christianity.42 
Although ‘nihilistic’ per se, technology prepared necessary structural changes globally and 
thus promoted a ‘total revolution.’43 Technology’s ability to spread rapidly throughout the 
world44 – its global nature – was crucial. While Freyer had similarly observed technology’s 
‘planetary’ power and the need to employ it to conservative ends, Jünger gave the argument a 
radical twist by underscoring both the nihilism of technology and the impetus of world 
revolutions as key elements of the anticipated global turn. Planetarity and technology were 
closely intertwined for both, but Freyer firmly defended political plurality against false 
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universalism, whereas Jünger sought to exploit technology for the unification of the world 
under conservative signs.  
 
With these Weimar arguments, the baseline for my further analysis is set. All three tied the 
aspect of the political conceptually with plurality and war as well as acknowledged the 
universalizing effects of technology and the emerging planetary perspective. Schmitt and 
Freyer felt the push beyond the nation state, yet still operated within that framework, 
nurturing the particularistic ‘political’ and explicitly rejecting the world state. Jünger’s 
thought, by contrast, carried distinctively global traits already here45, and this would later 
determine the parting of their ways. None of them, however, at this stage sought to ground 
their global theory significantly in a theology or philosophy of history, as for instance 
Wilhelm Stapel did in his 1932 call for a planetary German empire, which would unite the 
world in anticipation of the Christ and, in the absence of resistance, terminate world history.46 
Eschatology only entered their global thought during WW2, and the rupture of 1945 
intensified the paradox inherent in the attempt to globalize the political conceived in 
particularistic categories. I will next address their reactions in the altered situation 
individually. 
 
3. Schmitt: Spatial plurality against world unity  
 
During the Third Reich, Schmitt legitimized Nazi policies legally and theoretically. It is, 
however, only after his breach with the regime around 1936 that Schmitt began creatively 
theorizing the international order. He called for novel structures to reanchor ‘the political’ set 
loose from the nation state framework, and this provoked some of his most notorious notions. 
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From 1939 onwards, Schmitt perceived a fundamental shift with regard to the idea of space 
(Raum). The spatial grounds for international law were being revolutionized by a transition to 
an order based on the category of ‘greater space’ (Großraum) rather than the state. This 
development had a double root. First, it was driven by economic interests: a Großraum was 
‘an area of human planning, organisation and activity,’ and the very concept derived from 
technical, industrial, and organisatory considerations.47 Second, the Großraum perspective 
arose as a result of states’ political action. The deeds of the Führer created a strong German 
Reich capable of ‘radiating’ its ideology all over Europe, making Großraum and Reich the 
key concepts of the international order.48 
 
This primarily economic and political shift also had legal and military ramifications. 
International law applied only between greater spaces, not within them, as dictated by 
Schmitt’s principle of non-intervention, modelled after the Monroe Doctrine. Greater spaces 
would be like traditional states in many respects: there would be trade and diplomacy between 
them, and they still enjoyed unlimited jus belli and full sovereignty within their territory. The 
world order still was a balance of power, which required a plurality of greater spaces. In 
shifting to continental proportions Schmitt thus retained the key structural features of his 
nationalistic Weimar theory. However, Schmitt warned against mechanically extending the 
legal categories of states and peoples onto greater spaces, since they were historically bound 
up with ‘Anglo-Saxon world-imperialism’ and belonged to the ‘planetary law of nations’ that 
had emerged in early modernity with the extension of European notions into ‘the planetary 
space.’49 This undesirable planetary universalism was to be replaced by a benign German 
‘planetary’ Großraum perspective that would transgress ‘universalistic-imperialistic global 
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law’ with a novel view corresponding to the German notions of the state and the people.50 
Like Jünger, Schmitt was destined to substitute one form of planetarity for another. 
 
While liberal universalism sought to regulate political wars between states by judicial 
instruments, Schmitt was after a political solution. Rather than abstract normative categories, 
the containment of war would be based on spatial segregation into power blocks, each with 
their own sphere of operations and own notions of war.51 Großraum thought was thus the 
opposite of universalism, and although Schmitt failed to specify what made the German 
version less imperialistic, the upshot was that the division of the world into interest spheres 
secured global peace. Wars would be fought, free of normative-universalist constraints, 
between greater spaces, but their mutual recognition guaranteed duel-like limited warfare, and 
their space-boundedness secured a strong peace. Schmitt saw the on-going war as the first 
‘planetary war of space order’ that, correspondingly, could only be ended by a ‘peace based 
on an order of space.’52 Due to their spatial component, greater spaces were capable of 
demarcating friends and enemies better than traditional states whose enemies lied within. 
Based on Western universalistic normativism, wars would become ideological and intense 
‘international world civil war’53 – and permanent. The Großraum structure, by contrast, 
provided the necessary spatial groundings for world peace, indeed the Earth’s new ‘nomos,’ 
i.e. order. 
 
In order to criticize current universalism, Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth (1950) engaged 
historically with earlier attempts to reflect the globe as a political entity. Written during the 
war, the book bitterly chronicled the decay of Eurocentric world order, recycling the above 
space-related arguments with added historical insights. Schmitt now increasingly introduced 
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‘global’ and ‘planetary’ to his vocabulary, being generally concerned with the Nomos of the 
whole globe.54 However, Schmitt still promoted the balance of Großräume as a solution, now 
rather historically scrutinizing the reasons for its dismissal despite the empirical rise of 
Großräume as economic-political factors. The unsurprising culprits were the Monroe 
Doctrine and the League of Nations’ ‘spaceless’ principles – the result the dissolution of the 
European balance into ‘global civil war.’55 For Schmitt, the Cold War predicament was thus a 
direct consequence of the judicial regulation of political affairs and the concomitant 
intensification of hostilities. Paradoxically, the answer to the genuinely global problem of 
pacifying the Earth could only arise out of unconstrained political particularism. Yet complete 
global domination was ruled out by Schmitt’s basic postulates; his solution was a division of 
space between at least two, but preferably more power centers by a contingent equilibrium 
arising out of political war. 
 
From 1950 onwards, Schmitt’s arguments against universalism and world unity relied 
increasingly on philosophy and theology of history, the fifth of our interpretative themes. 
Without considering their admittedly speculative basis we cannot fully comprehend Schmitt’s 
institutional propositions, and the same goes for Freyer and Jünger. Having previously 
observed an increase in the size of the spatial units of planning, Schmitt criticized such 
planning as based on unfounded historical-philosophical categories. Interestingly, the key 
ideas derived from Freyer’s criticism of the philosophy of history and his analysis of 
dominion and planning56, which in turn utilized Schmitt’s political categories. ‘The planning 
and leading elites,’ whether Marxian or liberal, invoked the philosophy of history to justify 
plans and located themselves on the side of the coming things.57 Schmitt credited Karl Löwith 
for showing how all such constructions were forms of secularized eschatology, and proceeded 
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to analyze whether eschatology and history were compatible in the first place. If the 
apocalypse was imminent, there was little room for properly historical action; however, the 
same stagnation followed from cyclical views of history, such as Nietzsche’s eternal return of 
the same, Schmitt reasoned. This was the theoretical dilemma that not only occupied Schmitt 
personally in the post-war era when his country and career were both in ruins, but also 
determined his positions with regard to the global order. 
 
Schmitt himself aimed at a view where history still continued (rather than being terminated 
with the eschaton), where the direction of history was open (rather than predestined by 
inevitable progress) and where concrete historical actions were seen as unique (rather than 
history endlessly repeating itself). To this end he introduced the katechon, the force that 
restrained the end of the world, which he had developed since 1942, but here explicitly 
attributed to Freyer’s Weltgeschichte Europas.58 The katechon not only upheld history in the 
abstract sense, but, as history was the site of all political action, also the condition where 
political distinctions could still be made. Schmitt anticipated that before the end of the world, 
all differences would dispel and the unity of the world emerge.59 His resistance of world 
unification and unipolarity thus had theological underpinnings: at least one counter-power 
was needed to resist the Antichrist. Further, as technology was the key catalyst of planetary 
uniformity and apparent neutralization of political conflicts, Schmitt’s early depiction of the 
‘satanic’ nature of technology fitted the scheme perfectly. 
 
In institutional terms, Schmitt asked whether the world would consist of one, two, or several 
power constellations, himself advocating a ‘pluralistic’ view. First, he denied the existence of 
a single political center despite various biological, theological and technical-commercial 
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unification tendencies.60 The current East/West opposition would not become a unity, as 
postulated by both liberal and socialist philosophies of history, but a ‘plurality’ of Großräume 
with a balance of power similar to that in the traditional ius publicum europaeum.61 The 
reason for this belief, Schmitt explicitly noted, was that he did not share the philosophy of 
history that postulated a single telos whether in Hegelian terms or as the inevitable progress 
proposed by liberalism.62 Particularly the restraining katechon figure thus precluded world 
unification. 
 
Second, duality was equally untenable. While earlier identifying world unity with unilinear 
philosophies of history, in 1955 Schmitt resisted the Nietzschen philosophy of eternal return 
which he perceived as manifesting in how Jünger presented the East/west division as an 
eternal metaphysical dualism. The interplay of impulses and counter-impulses would reiterate 
the polar opposition in endlessly new variants, while Schmitt was after truly historical 
uniqueness.63 This consideration also determined his position with regard to the world-state 
that Jünger anticipated, which would uphold the eternal return, whereas for Schmitt 
everything was true only once.64 Schmitt’s rejection of the world-state thus built on a 
philosophical rejection of not only the unilinear idea of world unity, but also of cyclical 
conceptions of time. To erect a world-state on a dualist basis would be even worse than 
founding it upon universalism, for this would combine unity with duality, and the latter in 
Schmitt’s personal semantics implied civil war.65 Should the two superpowers unite for 
pragmatic reasons, it would only be an apparent peace. 
 
In 1962, Schmitt then historicized these questions, considering the Cold War in three phrases. 
Cold War’s roots, Schmitt claimed, went back to 1943 and the common belief by both the 
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USA and the Soviet Union that universal peace and world unity would ensue with a victory 
over Nazi Germany. In the second phase, starting in 1947, the originally illusionary monism 
was replaced by a bipolar structure and enmity between the two superpowers. Only 
‘progressive utopias and technological fantasies’ remained of world unity, and the 
incapability of the United Nations reflected the central division.66 Currently, with the 
dissolution of earlier colonial structures and the industrialization of underdeveloped countries, 
the world was going through the third phrase, a transition to a ‘pluralistic and multipolar 
structure’ of several Großraum formations.67 Schmitt now empirically observed the 
development from duality toward plurality (rather than unity), which he earlier assumed 
purely philosophically. 
 
Schmitt’s theology of history precluded unipolarity, identified with being non-political, while 
his theory of the political ruled out bipolarity, identified with civil war. Against these two 
evils, the postulate of pluralism served simultaneously both to uphold the political condition 
and to guard against global civil war. The over-determined assumption, despite its 
nationalistic-particularistic origins, thus formed the backbone of Schmitt’s global theory. Yet, 
another ‘recovering Hegelian’ shared the presupposition and resisted world unity with parallel 
categories – and arguably more successfully. 
 
4. Freyer: Universal history driven by political particularity 
 
Also Freyer mapped the philosophical-theological basis of the emerging world order. As 
noted, Schmitt adopted from Freyer the katechon figure and the link between planning and 
philosophy of history. Whereas Schmitt advocated a particular philosophy of history aiming 
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at upholding the historical condition, Freyer pursued this goal by, at least nominally, 
criticizing all forms of the philosophy of history and particularly that of his one-time inspirer 
Hegel. Freyer’s strategy, particularly in Weltgeschichte Europas (1948), was to mold world 
history as an empirical sum of numerous political actors’ voluntaristic impulses and to reflect 
it at large. The apparent world unity in historical terms was always underpinned by political 
plurality, he argued. To guard the pluralism, however, Freyer equally introduced ‘restraining 
forces’ that hindered the increasing uniformity caused by industrialization – and thus arguably 
grounded his observations on a particular philosophy of history, not at all unlike Schmitt’s. 
Deriving from the 1948 volume, this aspect was crucial in Freyer’s Theorie des 
gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1955), an ostensibly moderate cultural critique of the industrial 
societies, building, however, largely on Freyer’s prewar radicalism, and calling for 
conservative counter-forces. Schmitt was impressed by how Freyer captured the dilemma of 
the present historical situation. However, while Schmitt’s strategy was to directly disclose the 
ideological imperialism behind any apparent universality, the backbone of Freyer’s analysis 
was a historical relativization of universality into the effects of particular political deeds by 
powerful nations. 
 
Freyer underscored European impulses in global affairs, yet rejected the idea of a uniform 
world history as a secularized theological idea deriving from Enlightenment philosophy rather 
than a properly historical postulate.68 In 19th-century realist historiography, the belief in world 
unity dispelled and history was parcelled into peoples, states and empires.69 Such historicism 
largely harmonized with Freyer’s political theory of a plurality of states, each making their 
autonomous political decisions and affecting the course of history. Rather than an ever-
present universal category, politics was to be understood as an ingredient of particular 
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historical situations in which states or imperia made consicous decisions to risk their 
existence in historical struggles.70 This framing of the political derived from Freyer’s prewar 
work. In harmony with Schmitt’s criticism against neutralizations, Freyer identified a 19th-
century attempt to privatize morality, identify the political with the economical and thus 
perform a ‘conjuring away of the political.’71 The political, however, could not be secularized, 
neutralized or naturalized, since it was a ‘quintessence’ of earthly and historical humanity.72 
Freyer linked the political with manifestions of national particularity in history as well as 
described it in energetic terms: rather than an abstract framework, the political was the 
precondition for ‘this particular religion, this art, this science and philosophy,’ and with 
Machiavelli he underlined that there were no abstract rules for right conduct, but that the 
unevenly distributed political substance of virtù was what made the difference.73 Politics and 
historical particularity were thus co-extensive. Rather than a universal or ever-present quality, 
the political was an energetic principle that allowed political nations to make their mark in 
world history, thereby creating particularly political epochs. 
 
This stress on particularity, however, did not preclude historical forces’ empirical universal 
effects. Numerous historical moments took world history forward, such as the invention of the 
military chariot, the medieval migrations, the voyages of discovery or the Holy Roman 
Empire as a universal force that carried the heritage of Rome.74 Europe and other historical 
powers had pushed world history toward illusory unity, although the humankind was not a 
unified subject of history and world history was a unity only apparently.75 Globality and 
planetarity were thus not to be confused with political or historical unity, which was still 
precluded by Freyer’s revised Hegelianism. There were two principal causes for global 
effects. First, the universalizing effects stood on political grounds: particularly imperialism 
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and colonialism played a key role. Like Schmitt, Freyer posited that precisely the expansion 
of intra-European conflicts onto surrogate objects enabled the relative pacification of 
Europe.76 But as Europe itself was not a unity, the global expansion of European impulses in 
the colonial era brought about a ‘plurality’ of power positions, all with their imperialistic 
aims.77 This caused ‘an expansion of Europe and its conflicts in distant spaces.’78 With 
colonialism, the germ that emerged in Europe ‘infected the whole planet’ – ‘a genuine 
restructuring of the political Earth, a recharging of distant spaces with world-historical 
energies,’ indeed ‘a planetary process,’ took place.79 
 
Second, another key factor was, again, technology. In modernity, political decisions affected 
world affairs through technology, and only highly industrialized states had a say in world 
politics. The world had industrialized as a result of European initiatives, and only in the era of 
technology could world history shed its European core and become truly global. While earlier 
the universal impulses had mostly come from Europe, after rougly 1860, Freyer claimed, 
world unity was promoted by other areas, such as the US and Russia, and European world 
history thereby turned into genuine ‘world history of the whole Earth.’80 Industry became a 
‘politicum,’ and a new labile balance of industrial powers emerged and ‘closed around the 
planet.’81 In his influential criticism of the industrial society, Freyer called this new structure 
the artificial layer of ‘secondary systems’ that, lying ‘all around the planet,’ insulated modern 
societies from the organic national basis.82 Technological and moral progress standardized the 
life of all nations, and a particular type of civilized human being spread ‘all over the Earth.’83 
 
Technology implied planetarity, but the motive was political. Based on his prewar affirmative 
analysis of ‘planning,’ Freyer now criticized ideological planning – that is, socialist and 
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liberal attempts to make world a perfect place by following a blueprint allegedly necessitated 
by history, an idea directly continuing early-modern utopianism. Yet with the new structure of 
the political Earth, the political units for which planning was done had grown out of 
proportions. Liberal politics was still utopian, but with the advance from small states to large 
nations, federations and continental formations, the island of traditional utopias had turned 
into ‘greater space [Großraum], continent, or, in the extreme case, planet.’84 Rather than 
endorsing this development, Freyer noted it empirically and critically with respect to his 
concerns about ideological planning. Nevertheless, the plurality of greater spaces also meant 
that cultural uniformity was not complete and that movements in world history could still 
radiate from the greater spaces controlled by particular nations. In especially ‘global-historical 
situations,’ restricted particularity and ‘the pluralism of the historical world’ temporarily 
captured ‘the universal order’ and supported it, thereby becoming durable and consequential 
historical forces.85 In other words, particular political forces upheld universal history in turns, 
and universalism thus fed on particularity. Defined as particularity with universal historical 
effects, the political could be expanded spatially, and in fact Freyer followed Schmitt in 
noting how European religious tensions went global in the battle of Catholicism and 
Protestantism in and for the colonies, which turned European politics into ‘world history’ and 
expressed ‘pure political existence.’86 
 
The Cold War oppositions manifested this globalization of European impulses, yet precisely 
the particularity of political prowess set limits to the universalizing process. The increased 
size of political units, the decrease of their number, or their occasional universalistic missions 
did not bring a ‘final unity of the whole Earth’ any closer.87 The humanity had never been a 
single entity with unified goals and plans, but rather always divided and ‘loaded with 
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enormous tensions.’88 Any idea of unity was mere secularized eschatology: ‘The promised 
victory of the Church before the end of the world has turned into the one world moved 
together by technology, transportation and politics and now organizable for any given 
future.’89 
 
For Freyer, the one world was an illusion, because national differentials still loomed large. If 
one wanted to reflect upon the Earth as a single globe, it resembled a ‘space ship’ with no 
unified crew or leaders and with all conflicts taken on board.90 In fact, a paradoxical downside 
of the widened planetary perspective was that it underlined internal tensions. This problem 
followed from Freyer’s depiction of world history as an empirical sum of particularistic 
forces’ universal effects. The engagement with world history, rather than mere national 
histories, opened the door for the idea of international conflicts as internal strifes of a single 
humanity – a position Freyer’s premises denied, but his historical speculations suggested. 
 
Freyer’s post-Hegelian approach was significantly better equipped to deal with the paradox of 
globalizing the political than Schmitt’s; yet also his categories implied that political 
particularity produced universalism through war and technology, and to counter this unifying 
tendency, both thinkers resorted to the theology of history. With unification thus theoretically 
excluded, the adopted planetary perspective could, conceptually, only mean a condition of 
latent or actual civil wars between the planet’s inhabitants. Before returning to this paradox in 
my concluding section, I will, however, explicate how Jünger dealt with the problem. 
 
5. Jünger: Post-history and the post-political world-state 
 
	   26 
As noted, Jünger’s Der Arbeiter endorsed a planetary perspective. Yet only his postwar work 
explicitly addressed world unification – in a different key. The shift from nation-states to 
globality can be traced to Jünger’s wartime diaries: in 1943, disillusined with the nationalistic 
war effort, Jünger identified himself as simultaneously ‘a Welf, a Prussian, a citizen of 
Greater Germany, a European and a citizen of the world.’91 In light of the earlier planetary 
aspects, this was, however, a shift of emphasis rather than a rupture. When Jünger published 
his ‘Der Friede’ (‘Peace,’ 1945), the world situation had altered profoundly, as had his 
thoughts. The essay was ostensibly a pacifistic call for a lasting peace, seasoned with 
theological elements. Jünger turned from existential affirmation of battle to stressing the 
planetary consequences of war and the desired qualities of the anticipated peace. While earlier 
cherishing planetary revolutionary action under conservative signs, he now pejoratively 
diagnosed a planetary division: ‘As sons of the Earth, we are in civil war, in fraternal strife,’ 
indeed a ‘global civil war’ (Weltbürgerkrieg).92 The war – the first collective effort of the 
humankind – had turned the Earth as a ‘globe’ (Kugel) into a battlefield; correspondingly, the 
peace to truly end the smouldering conflict would have to encompass the whole planet and its 
population, Jünger proposed, echoing Schmitt’s spatial notion of peace.93 Strong pacts were 
needed to end the fraternal strife, but a peace in a stronger sense required synodal dimensions 
and the churches to reunite against nihilism.94 Having earlier valued the nihilism inherent in 
technology for its ability to wreck ecclesiastic structures, Jünger now adopted a theological 
perspective to counter the nihilism of a completely technologized world. 
 
The political remedy, however, was the consolidation of nation-states into larger wholes. 
Human history now urged ‘a planetary order’ and ‘the division of the earth into great living 
spaces [große Lebensräume].’95 New federations and ‘greater Reichs’ would emerge, and a 
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balance of continents and empires, rather than nations, would maintain world order.96 This 
perspective made Jünger an advocate of European unification: a new ‘order of space’ 
(Raumordnung) would arise and provide Europe with ‘geopolitical unity.’97 The affinity with 
Schmitt’s categories is apparent; yet whereas Schmitt first advocated a German-led greater 
space and after WW2 reflected upon the various nomoi of the Earth only historically, Jünger 
rather supported a politically unified Europe on the basis of voluntary contracts, rather than 
force, and by respecting both unity and diversity. This was a perceivable breakaway from 
radical conservative premises. Moreover, the European greater space was only an 
intermediary step towards a world-state (Weltstaat). The objectives of the humankind were no 
longer on the level of nation-states or greater spaces, but pertained to ‘the planet altogether.’98 
 
This shift of scale from nation-states through Großraum formations to planetarity recurred in 
particularly in Jünger’s World-State (1960). The foundations of the state had become elastic: 
through the expansion of the areas for which plans were made, Jünger noted with Freyer, 
states not only encompassed larger populations but had also changed qualitatively.99 
Currently the ‘globe’ (Globus) was divided by two massive states with absolute sovereignty 
over a territory.100 Nevertheless, increasing uniformity and a ‘global style’ was perceivable in 
the production of similar forms, such as the appeals to the shared categories of ‘peace,’ 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ or the use of the same technology.101 Jünger’s anticipation of a 
world-state, however, was not so much based on observed cultural unification, but, first, on 
the expediency of a global power structure given the planetary tasks and, second, its quasi-
causal inevitability. The world-state was not only desirable but also already in process just 
like a caterpillar would become a butterfly with respect to its inherent final causes.102 In fact a 
‘planetary order’ and a transition to a world-state or ‘world imperium’ (Weltreich) was 
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already ‘consummated’ and only had to be acknowledged.103 A global state was arising, 
because it must. 
 
While Schmitt and Freyer explicitly denied that the Cold War duality would be a step from 
plurality toward world unity, Jünger asserted precisely this. The situation of two ‘world-
states’ was untenable, as the very idea of a world-state excluded ‘plurality.’104 A single world-
state had to emerge for conceptual reasons. This, however, did not stop Jünger from 
maintaining the postulate of the state form being ‘determined by pluralism’ – he now only 
observed that historically this had not always been the case and anticipated a single state to 
reintroduce a condition where, in the absence of rivalry, no armies were needed.105 Military 
and economic competition would cease, armies would become police forces, and ‘Earth 
plans’ would replace state plans.106 A single superstate in a stateless world was the 
precondition of genuine planetary peace. This was so not despite Jünger’s agonistic belief in 
the inevitability of warfare but precisely therefore: while Schmitt believed in the political 
solution of containing war by balances of power and spatial segragation, Jünger’s either/or 
only allowed the eradication of states, the subjects of war. His moderate pacifism was thus 
intellectually more radical than Schmitt’s balancing act. Further, wars waged as police 
operations horrified Schmitt, but here, too, Jünger transcended his innate nationalism. 
 
In addition to this political framing and human history, the world-state also arose from the 
considerations of ‘the history of the Earth.’107 The planetary perspective beyond mere 
internationalism allowed for the demarcation of human time from the time of nature and the 
relativization of human civilization vis-à-vis long-term natural processes. The Earth was 
presently in distress in terms of climate change, as Jünger observed significantly early on. 
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Jünger noted the possibility of global warming by a few degrees, the consequent glacier melt, 
the loss of land, ‘ethnic invasions,’ and – with almonds growing in Norway – ‘a new global 
style.’108 Behind anticipated cultural unification thus laid a genuinely planetary problem that 
the emerging world-state needed to address, thus paradoxically postponing rather than 
endorsing cultural universality. 
 
However, the intellectual price Jünger paid for this aspect of utility was enormous. First, in 
contrast to Schmitt’s aspirations, such a world order would be thoroughly non-political in the 
sense implied by the radical conservative view of the political world consisting of several 
sovereign units with their respective areas, interests and cultures. As Schmitt underlined the 
eventuality of war as the criterion of the political, Jünger’s world-state would, for Schmitt, be 
a non-political or post-political condition – and unattainable. In fact striving beyond conflicts 
would merely conceal genuinely prevailing tensions and fabricate apparitions that served 
some parties’ ideological interests. Striving toward post-politics would thus be a particularly 
political move, regardless of whether the goal was achieved. The inevitability of the political 
followed logically from, first, Schmitt’s conceptual coupling of the political with the 
eventuality of war and, second, from his belief in the ineridicability of wars. Schmitt was 
affectively committed to the category of the political, and war was its guarantee. Jünger, by 
contrast, was more concerned with the questions of war to begin with and rather treated 
politics as an extension thereof, and having no comparable conceptual loyalties he could 
easily afford advocating a transition to the post-political. In fact, such a transition germinated 
already in 1932, when Jünger, rather than merely developing nationalistic ideas, sketched the 
framework for future politics from a ‘metapolitical’ perspective with apocalyptic overtones. 
This strategy remained in the 1950s.109 To cherish human freedom, Jünger now theorized 
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resignation, witdrawal from the society, and passive resistance on an individualistic basis, and 
became a literal-esoteric rather than a properly political thinker. 
 
Second, the end state Jünger envisioned would also be non-historical. Jünger argued for a 
transition from the historical to the posthistorical period, comparing the present situation with 
that of Herodotos who, standing on a summit, glanced on both dark prehistory and the 
dawning historical epoch. The future for Jünger’s contemporaries was equally dark and 
unknown, yet beyond the mythical ‘time wall’ there would no longer be history as known so 
far.110 The truly planetary perspective was ‘metahistorical’ as it provided ‘glimpses to a world 
beyond history,’ and eventually Earth history would ‘infringe human history and terminate 
it.’111 While a transition to post-history was allegedly objectively happening in the world, a 
conscious transition to a new level in the categories of thought was necessary to ensure peace. 
Already in his wartime diaries Jünger observed that transcending the world of destruction 
could not succeed ‘on the historical plain.’112 
 
The obscure amalgamation of need and factuality made Jünger’s prose suggestive rather than 
analytical, but in stressing a single world-state in a world beyond politics and history, he 
saliently deviated from Schmitt and Freyer. In his late essays, Schmitt invoked the katechon 
precisely to protect historicity from the eschatological condition where all demarcations, and 
thereby the basis of collective identity, would be replaced by cultural unity. Equally, for 
Freyer, this would spell the end of politics, and by the end of statal decisions with epochal 
consequences, the end of world history in general. Jünger, by contrast, prioritized the 
planetary tasks, and in indirectly reckoning with his own military past, he abandoned war for 
the sake of peace. Rather than deradicalizing his conservatism in the postwar period like 
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Freyer, Jünger renounced politics altogether and justified this depoliticization theoretically 
with an apocalyptic theory of a qualitatively different mode of being after the end of 
history.113 The meta-/postpolitical and the meta-/posthistorical elements were inseparable, and 
both aspects germinated already in Der Arbeiter, the relevance of which Jünger underscored 
with a later commentary: not only would the transition of the worker from ‘planetary power to 
planetary order’ terminate ‘the era of warring states’ upon a ‘divided Earth’ and bring about 
the world-state, but also time itself was changing and events were no longer historical.114 The 




All three radical conservatives posited structural changes of the international system, 
consisting of an increase in the size of political units and a corresponding decrease in their 
number. Proceeding from nation-states through federal states to larger spaces and continent-
wide interest spheres, the development manifested a trend toward world unification. Yet, for 
these thinkers, unification and universalism implied the end of politics. Their key categories 
were designed to mediate globality and the political, and thus reflected the inherent paradox 
in globalizing what emerged in a nationalistic framework to cherish particularity. 
 
First, all three underscored plurality – from Schmitt’s note of the political world as a 
‘pluriverse’ to Freyer’s thesis of the ‘pluralism of the historical world’ and Jünger’s 
restatement of a ‘pluralism’ of other states as a defining feature of a political state. The 
function of the conceptual tie between plurality and the state was for Schmitt and Freyer to 
resist global uniformity, whether moral, legal or technological, and they systematically upheld 
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this premise also after 1945. Jünger, by contrast, abandoned it for reasons of exigency, 
underlining that the existence of other states was a characteristic of the state historically, but 
hoping this could be transcended.115 Both solutions were equally consistent; yet both reflect 
the self-inflicted either/or of political particularity and unpolitical universalism that shackled 
German radical conservatism. 
 
Second, for all three, the reflection of the Earth as a planet provided the wider categories 
beyond the sequence national/international/global – qualitatively, rather than merely in terms 
of extension. The radical conservatives were, certainly, not alone in their planetarity: for 
instance Ernst Troeltsch followed H. G. Wells in speaking of a ‘planetary situation,’ and Karl 
Jaspers, building on Heidegger, equally saw the technical age as an ‘absolutely universal’ and 
‘planetary’ age.116 However, for the radical conservatives, the planetary perspective served 
several particular functions. It linked Schmitt’s theories to considerations of space rather than 
mere ‘internationalism’ or abstract liberal normativism. It allowed Freyer to reformulate the 
possibility of universal history in political terms as the history of the universal effects of 
European civilization. It enabled Jünger to surpass nationalistic confines first in favor of 
global apocalyptic visions of work and planning and, eventually, rudimentary ecological 
perspectives. 
 
Third, technology played a key role in the planetary turn ever since Schmitt’s early depiction 
of ‘satanic’ technology, Freyer’s arguments on technology’s universalizing power and 
Jünger’s planetary visions. For all three, technology was not only an index of globalization 
but also a key factor therein – and as technology manifested Western Enlightenment 
rationality and was steadily put to political uses, also the consequent global uniformity bore 
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distinctively political traits. Technology reflected the Western particularity that emulated 
universality and produced effects that were political with respect to their origins and inner 
logic, yet by definition non-political in undermining national differentials. In the radical-
conservative framework, the paradoxical nature of technology, I claim, reflected the more 
fundamental paradox of globalizing the political. 
 
Fourth, this directly implied a position with regard to the question of war – the ultimate 
manifestation of technical rationality. Modern total wars not only mobilized industrial 
resources totally but also became global in extension, thus further exemplifying technology’s 
planetary tendency. War, however, was also a political phenomenon par excellence, and 
technological progress thus globalized the political. Not commerce and cultural exchange, but 
above all the spreading of political ideologies, conflicts, and warfare as their culmination had 
made the world situation truly planetary. All three conservatives lamented the substitution 
ideological crusades for the traditional wars waged with mutual respect, or, in Freyer’s 
formulation, ‘the ideologization of world politics and the universalization of the situation of 
civil war.’117 This diagnosis suited their need to represent Germany as a collateral victim in an 
ideological confrontation between (American) liberalism and (Russian) socialism, thereby 
historically relativizing the German contribution to ideological intensification. More crucially, 
however, the civil war argument was intimately interlinked with the planetary perspective. In 
a world-state of planetary proportions, there would empirically still be conflicts, although 
wars of international scale could presumably be avoided: Jünger in fact considered it utopian 
to assume the world-state to bring complete peace.118 
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Moreover, when reflected from the point of view of the whole Earth, wars were eo ipso 
internal strifes. This was a major challenge for the radical conservatives’ categories, as it 
appeared to make civil wars inevitable. Jünger was significantly more tolerant than Schmitt, 
or Freyer following him, toward civil wars. For Schmitt, civil wars were ideological and 
therefore particularly intense and destructive wars, the absolute evil. Already this premise 
ruled out a genuinely planetary perspective: although reflected as a whole, the world had to be 
divided into at least two political spheres in order to maintain regular wars and avoid civil 
wars. We may critically claim that Schmitt here wrongly amalgamated his point regarding 
how civil wars were waged with the question of who waged them, that conflicts would not 
automatically be fiercer simply because they were waged within a global structure and that to 
use the intensity argument against the world-state therefore was a non sequitur. At any rate, 
the planetary perspective threathed to turn wars conceptually into civil wars, and Schmitt and 
Freyer resisted planetarization precisely for this reason, while Jünger maintained planetarity 
and tolerated minor fraternal strifes. The civil war perspective has since obtained a curious 
afterlife in analyzes of world terrorism as a form of ‘global civil war.’119 
 
Fifth, the radical conservatives’ views on the structural changes of the world system were 
based on their respective philosophies of history: Schmitt’s model of counter-forces 
upholding history, Freyer’s empirical plurality of world history and restraining forces 
resisting industrial universalism and Jünger’s dawning post-history with the eternal 
recurrence of the same. The three radical conservatives were, obviously, not the first or last to 
combine state theory with the metaphysics of history. Their predecessors in the end of history 
debate included Hegel with whom both Freyer and Schmitt engaged, Alexandre Kojève 
whose second-order Hegelianism fascinated Schmitt, and the fellow-conservative Arnold 
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Gehlen whose theory of cultural crystallization and the end of history in the industrial society 
closely resembled Freyer’s.120 Fukuyama’s post-Cold War thesis on the end of history 
reinvigorated these considerations. Destined to keep history running, Schmitt and Freyer 
perceived tendencies of stagnation in the industrial society, yet resisted the end of history 
theses as well as cyclical views. Despite contrary tendencies of technology-driven uniformity, 
history understood as plurality would still continue. After jettisoning the Hegelian unity of 
history and reason, and thereby the idea of a suprahistorical criterion, Freyer sought to make 
history itself into such a criterion, providing a right-Hegelian form of historicism. Liberated 
from its unilinearity, universal history was possible as an empirical sum of cultural conquest, 
differentiation and recognition-seeking: world history was the final frontier beyond which no 
overarching principle could be found. While this model implied a multi-polar world order, 
Jünger’s philosophy of the overcoming of history suggested a unified world-state. For all 
three, speculative theology or philosophy of history served to indirectly answer the dilemma 
of the globalized political – Schmitt’s katechon postponing unpolitical universality, Freyer 
relativizing the quasi-Hegelian political forms into empirical world-history, and Jünger ‘non-
politicizing the political’121 by renouncing history. 
 
Sixth, the question of what happened to the political in the transition to planetarity runs 
through all the previous categories, and this problem culminated in the question of the world 
state – arguably the litmus test for radical conservative categories. Here the three 
conservatives were again in esteemed company. Declaring nationalism as obsolete, Wells 
advocated a federal world-state, and after WW2, Arnold Toynbee equally considered world 
government inevitable in of the atomic age, while Karl Jaspers regarded ‘the political unity of 
the Earth’ as merely a matter of time and Hans Morgenthau called for a world-state to secure 
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permanent peace.122 Schmitt’s case was straightforward: the political was a relation between 
two or more political entities, based on the possibility of war, and the political could therefore 
only be expanded to greater spaces, not fully globalized. The world-state would be a non-
political state, and Schmitt’s philosophy of history served to set a limit to unification. Freyer 
rather historicized the political into a contingent and limitedly available virtù-like substance 
that enabled countries or continents to rise to political grandeur with universalizing effects. Its 
consequences were global, but the political itself was a rare and particularistic quality, 
deriving from national cultural resources. The plurality of the political ultimately precluded 
the political unity of the world and determined also Freyer’s preference for a balance of 
power. 
 
Jünger took radically diverging routes. ‘Conservatives,’ Jünger argued, preferred counter-
powers and a world divided into three or more parts, while his own preference was a single 
world-state.123 The transition beyond the political and the historical was the theoretical price 
Jünger was willing to pay for this commitment; or perhaps the grandiose planetary claims 
reflected a personal choice, induced by guilt, which the institutional commitment to world 
government then epitomized. Either way, for Jünger, ‘a solution to the dilemma of the 
political’ could ‘be found only outside of history’ and with ‘the exclusion of the political in 
Schmitt’s sense,’ as noted by Hohendahl.124 More precisely, the paradox of the globalized 
political, I claim, was what drove the reconceptualization. 
 
It was, however, questionably whether the radical-conservative political could be genuinely 
globalized. On account of the nationalistic-particularist roots of ‘the political’ and the 
gradually accumulated auxiliary assumptions, the radical-conservatives had to choose either 
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true globality at the price of non-political posthistoire or the genuinely political condition 
with history, contestation – and planetary civil war. Incapable of solving the riddle in any 
other manner than by sword, Schmitt, Freyer, and Jünger passed it on to their successors.125 
Neither alternative is particularly tempting or suitable for addressing the present global 
challenges. To comprehend and, where suitable, contest contemporary verbalizations of the 
dilemma, it is crucial to know the particularly ideological stage in the pre-history of European 
globalization theory this language derives from as well as the key questions the language 
sought to answer. We comprehend the current calls for globality without universalism better 
if we understand how they were foreshadowed by the mid-20th-century discourse of 
‘planetary’ anti-universalism. The radical-conservative categories are bound to remain with 
us, and so is the question of political globalization, regardless of whether it is seen as an 
empirical trend or a necessity in the face of planetary challenges. A great part of how we 
respond to these challenges relates to how we frame them. Cognizant of the prehistory of 
globalization theory and how these historical layers are still mobilized against global political 
unification, we may better identify the ideological burden involved and ensure that we are 
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